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NOTES AND COMMENT
RiGHTS OF A VENDEE UNDER AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR THE
SALE OP REALTY AS DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON IN RECENT CAsEs.-Since the case of Ashford v. Reese, it

has been a much mooted question as to the extent of a vendee's
rights under an executory contract for the sale of realty The purpose of this article is not to discuss the correctness of the rule of
law as laid down in the Ashford case, but to examine the rights of
a vendee, irrespective of the question as to whether or not he should
have what is known in the law as an equitable title2
Logically, even though the doctrine of equitable conversion be
rejected, the vendee's remedy of specific performance should not
be affected. In the case of Pratt v. Rhodes3 , the Court, commenting upon the Ashford case, said.
"It was not there meant that an executory contract
for the sale of land vests no right in the vendee. It is not
held that the contract is a nullity The contract, on the
contrary, has all of the validity that any other executory
contract has which is duly and regularly executed by
parties competent to contract. Nor will the Courts m
every instance relegate the vendee to an action in damages where the contract is breached by the vendor. If
equity, justice, and good conscience require that the contract be specifically enforced, the Courts will enforce it
specifically "
In subsequent actions for specific performance, the vendee's
right to the remedy, once the validity of the contract was established, has been unquestioned 4 Doubt, however, was raised in
the minds of many, as to the enforceability of this remedy against
a subsequent purchaser. This was due largely to the contention of
Judge Tolman, in his dissenting opinion in the Ashford case,
wherein he maintained that as the contract conveyed no interest in
the land, it evidenced no interest, and consequently, even if recorded it would not be notice to a subsequent purchaser of any
interest in the land by the vendee. Since this decision, the legislature has passed an act' whereby executory contracts may be re1132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925), wherein it was held that an executory
contract of sale conveys no title or interest, either legal or equitable, to the
vendee.
2 For a discussion of this question see: P John Iachty, Rights and Estates of
Vendor and Vendee under an Executory Contract for the Sale of Realty. (1925)
1 WASH. LAw Rav. 9; Alfred J. Schweppe, Rights of a Vendee under an Executory
Forfeitable Contract for the Purchase of Real Estate. A Further Word on the
Washington Law. (1926) 2 WASH. LAw Ra. 1, (1927) 2 WASH. REV. 205; and
George D. Lantz, Rights of Vendees under Executory Contracts of Sale. (1928)
3 WAss. REv. 1.
2142 Wash. 411, 253 Pac. 640 (1927). Upon a rehearing en banc, the same
opinion was adhered to. 256 Pac. 503.
4Fallers v. Pnag, 144 Wash. 326, 257 Pac. 627 (1927) Hamilton v. Norns,
144 Wash. 326, 258 Pac. 4 (1927).
' Rem. Comp. Stat. (1927 Supp.) Sec. 10596-3; P. C. Sec. 1914-3.
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corded, and when so recorded shall be notice to all persons of the
rights of the vendee under the contract.
It is evident from this statute, that a subsequent purchaser with
notice cannot obtain a greater right than the vendor had. Consequently, as the vendee has a right of specific performance against
the vendor, he will also have the same right against a subsequent
purchaser with notice.
The right to maintain an action of trespass is also vested in the
vendee. In the case of Katemva v. SnyderO the Court, in answering
the contention of respondents that, as the appellants had only a
conditional sale contract for the purchase of the land occupied
by them, they therefore had no right to complain of any action of
the respondent, said
"Unquestionably as between the parties to this action,
it is sufficient upon which appellants can base their right
to possession of the land which they are purchasing, and
sufficient to authorize them to forbid any person to interfere with that possession."
In the recent case of Oliver v. McEachernl, an interesting question was raised bearing upon the extent of the vendee's rights
under an executory contract of sale. The vendee, plaintiff, brought
an action to have an easement declared in the abutting property,
which had been purchased by the defendant, subsequently, from
the same vendor. By mistake, the vendor had failed to reserve this
easement in the deed to the defendant although it had been included
by the vendor in the previous contract of sale with the plaintiff.
But physical factors, of which the defendant had notice, showed
the existence of the easement. The defense was raised that the yendee's possession and claim of right, being based upon no title, either
legal or equitable, gave no notice of any right or title in the vendee. The Court, in decreeing judgment in favor of the vendee,
said
"It is true that under the doctrine of the Ashford
case the respondent had no title and therefore appellants
could have received no notice of what did not, in fact,
exist, but neither in the Ashford case or elsewhere has this
Court said that a purchaser in possession under an executory contract has not rights. Undoubtedly, such purchaser does have a right of possession and a right to acquire title in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Such rights, though not amounting to title, are substantial
rights such as one having notice and knowledge is bound
to respect."
It will be noticed that the Court has confined its remarks in
the Katemva and Oliver cases, supra, to vendees in possession. Does
the Court thereby intimate that the vendee's rights will be determined by factual evidence? Such an interpretation is con( 143 Wash. 172, 254 Pac. 857 (1927).
7 49 Wash. Dec. 269, 271 Pac. 93 (1928)
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sistent with its statements. It is submitted, that if such is the
position to be taken by the court in the determination of the yendee's rights, it is erroneous, being -nconsistent with the principle
the Court has adopted. If the vendee has not equitable title or interest in the land, which the Court has repeatedly held' and yet he has
what the Court chooses to call "substantial rights," from where
must they spring? They must emanate from the contract itself,
and therefore, as these rights are purely contractual, the interpretation of the contract, and not factual evidence, should determine
those rights. But it has been said that although possession is not
the equivalent of ownership of, or title to real property, still one
in possession under such a contract, like any other bailee, may
maintain an action for conversion of or injury to the property9 The
Court, in the case of Stotts v. Puget Sound Tr & P Co.10, in considering the rights of a vendee of a truck under a conditional sales
contract, drew such an analogy But can it be said that the Court
has extended this analogy to vendees under executory contracts
for the sale of realty"? It is clear that it has not, for in none of
its decisions has it even intimated that such was the basis of its decision, but always has based them on the fact that the vendee has
certain rights which must be protected. In the Oliver case, supra,
the contract was not recorded, but the defendant was held to have
had actual notice of the vendee's rights. If the contract had been
recorded but the vendee had not been in possession, should his
rights have not been the same' If the vendee's rights flow from
the contract, it is clear that notice of those rights, as given by the
contract through the records, should be the determining factor, and
the question of whether or not the vendee is in possession should
be inmaterial.
The questions as to whether or not the vendee may restrain the
vendor from using the property mu a husband like manner, and
whether or not he may maintain an action for damages, have not
been raised. Another interesting question to be determined is
whether or not the vendee may maintain an action of ejectment.
The statute 2 provides
"Any person having a valid subsisting interest in real
property, and a right to the possesion thereof, may recover
sHolt Manufacturing Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925)
In Re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925), Peck v. Farmert.
National Bank, 137 Wash. 627, 243 Pac. 861 (1926), In Re Field's Estate, 141
Wash. 526, 252 Pac. 534 (1927), Norman v. Levenhagen, 142 Wash. 372. 253 Pac.
113 (1927), Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lumber Co., 146 Wash. 543, 264
Pac. 705 (1928). See also notes 1, 6, 7, supra.
0 1 WASH.. LAw REv. 8.

1094 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917)
Wash. 559, 74 Pac. 473 (1903),

Accord: Messenger v. Murphy, 33

Oras v. Allen, 133 Wash. 268, 233 Pac. 314

(1925).
"It should he noticed that all the cases which support this analogy related
to personality. Technically, the analogy cannot he applied to cases of realty
because a bailee isa holder of personal property.
22 Rem. Comp. Stat. Sec. 785, P C. Sec. 7517.
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the same by action in the Superior Court of the proper
county "

In the Oliver case, supra, the Court expressly stated that the
vendee had a right to possession, but in that case, as well as m

numerous others 1 3, it also stated that he had no interest in the
land. The statute, however, makes pre-requisite as a right to
maintain the action, not only a right to possession, but also an
interest in the land. Consequently, as a vendee is held to have no
interest, he is helpless to gain its possession, or if he has lost it, to
recover it. Could the court say, when such an issue is raised, that
the term "right" as used in the Katemva and Oliver eases could be
used as a substitute for "interest" as it appears in the statute"?
At the present time it is impossible to clearly define the extent
of a vendee's rights, but it is evident from the decisions on the
question, that the vendee has not as yet been affected by the rule
of the Ashford case"" Furthermore, the Court, m an effort to
protect him from the injustice of such a rule, has adopted, m one
line of cases, an exception to the rule itself, namely, that where
there is no forfeiture clause in the contract, an equitable title will
vest in the vendee 16 , and in cases where the exception has not applied, it has resorted to the theory of a vendee's "rights"
May it not be contended that the Court, by the use of the term

"rights", is attempting, without repudiating its former holdings,
to reach the position maintained by Courts which accept the doctrine of equitable conversion.
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"See note 8, supra.
'4 Under this statute prior entry

is not a requisite to the right to maintain
the action. Blanc s Cafe v. Corey, 110 Wash. 242, 188 Pac. 759 (1920)
In this
case the Court, in holding that a lessee had the right under the statute to maintain the action, cited the rule as stated in 1 TIFFANY ON LANDLORD AND TENANT,
Sec. 37, p. 293: "As regards the right of the lessee, before entry, to maintain
ejectment to the premises, it would seem that the cases asserting that right are
in accord with the modem rule that this action may be maintained by any person
having a right to possession." As a vendee has the right to possession, which by
modem authority is sufficient to sustain the action, the Court nght interpret
the statute to be merely cumulative and not an abrogation of the common law
right.
" The actual decision of the Ashford case, supra, on its facts, was favorable
to the vendee, holding that in case of destruction of the subject matter, the loss
would fall on the vendor. The vendor, however, may still protect hinself in such
cases, by inserting in the contract where the loss shall fall. Cameron v. Hurn, 147
Wash. 434, 266 Pac. 179 (1928)
" This exception was enunciated in the case of Aylward v. Lally, 147 Wash.
29, 264 Pac. 983. For a discussion of tlus case and the test therein laid down
as to whether or not the vendee has an equitable title, see: Alfred J. Schweppe,
The New Forfeiture Clause Test in Executory Contracts for the Sale of Rea
Estate, (1928) 3 WAsi. LAW REv. 80.

